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Threat Intelligence Daily · 2026-09-21

Fortinet telemetry confirms active exploitation of an unauthenticated Orkes Conductor RCE. Kaspersky documented a manufacturing intrusion where attackers used Group Policy for encryptionless extortion, while Securonix decoded TASK#STOMP as a persistent PowerShell backdoor for document theft and remote command execution.

1Critical2High0Medium0Low3Exploited3threats
1 CVEs5 IOCs
CVE-2026-58138

Changes since yesterday

  • NEW — Orkes Conductor:Fortinet telemetry confirms active exploitation of CVE-2026-58138. The pre-authentication workflow API flaw permits operating-system command execution on vulnerable Conductor servers.
  • NEW — Payload:Kaspersky documented an incident at a Middle Eastern manufacturer where the attackers used a malicious Group Policy Object to lock administrators out and display ransom material after stealing data, without deploying a file encryptor.
  • NEW — TASK#STOMP:Securonix decoded the final PowerShell payloads and confirmed automated business-document theft, continuous file monitoring, Wi-Fi password and clipboard collection, screenshots, and arbitrary remote commands through two C2 domains.
  • ONGOING — Linux KEV:September 21 is CISA’s remediation date for CVE-2025-39682, CVE-2026-53266 and CVE-2025-39964, reported on September 19. No reviewed source identifies the actor or a shared exploit chain.

Priority actions

  • Immediate:Upgrade exposed Orkes Conductor deployments to 3.30.2 or later. Until patched, remove external access to workflow API endpoints and review historical workflow submissions and child-process execution.
  • Immediate:Hunt Windows endpoints for TASK#STOMP’s %LOCALAPPDATA%\WinDefendSvc staging path, hidden PowerShell followed by csc.exe, the two confirmed C2 domains, and repeated XML-defined scheduled-task creation from wscript.exe.
  • Today:Review Group Policy creation and modification on Active Directory, especially policies that disable local administrator accounts, change desktop or lock-screen settings, or distribute ransom material. Protect GPO administration with separate privileged accounts and change auditing.
  • Today:Complete remediation and pre-patch telemetry review for the three Linux kernel KEV entries whose CISA target date is September 21.

Priority threats

Orkes Conductor pre-authentication RCE is being exploited

Severity
Critical
Status
Confirmed active exploitation
CVSS
9.8 (v3.1) / 9.3 (v4)
CVE
CVE-2026-58138
Affected
Orkes Conductor 3.21.21 before 3.30.2

CVE-2026-58138 allows an unauthenticated remote client to submit workflow definitions containing malicious JavaScript or Python expressions. Vulnerable GraalVM evaluators expose unrestricted host access, allowing those expressions to invoke operating-system commands with the Conductor process privileges.

Fortinet reported 1,290 blocked attempts in one 24-hour period ending September 9 and nearly 7,000 attempts from September 2 through 9. Independent honeypot telemetry cited in the same reporting observed exploitation attempts as early as July 24. Conductor 3.30.2 contains the fix.

Recommendations

  • Upgrade to Conductor 3.30.2 or later and verify the running deployment, including containers and stale replicas.
  • If patching is delayed, restrict workflow API endpoints to trusted networks and authenticated gateways.
  • Review workflow definitions for unexpected INLINE, LAMBDA, DO_WHILE or SWITCH tasks containing JavaScript/Python expressions, and correlate them with unusual child processes or outbound connections from Conductor.
Sources (1)

Payload uses Group Policy for encryptionless extortion

Severity
High
Status
Confirmed intrusion and extortion incident
Affected
Windows/Active Directory environments where attackers obtain privileges to modify Group Policy

Kaspersky’s Global Emergency Response Team described an incident at a manufacturing company in the Middle East in which the attackers stole corporate data and then used a malicious Group Policy Object named PAYLOAD for disruption. The policy disabled local administrator accounts and changed desktops and lock screens to ransom material. Kaspersky did not observe a conventional file-encryption payload in this incident.

The stolen data was later published on the dark web. The operational dependency is Active Directory control: once the attacker can modify Group Policy, endpoint malware scanning alone does not remove the policy that distributes the disruptive configuration.

Recommendations

  • Audit privileged Group Policy changes and alert on policies that alter local administrator access, desktop/lock-screen configuration, startup scripts, scheduled tasks or security controls across many hosts.
  • Restrict GPO modification to dedicated administrative identities and require strong authentication for those accounts.
  • During response, remove or neutralize malicious policy at its source before restoring endpoint configuration; preserve domain-controller and Group Policy audit logs first.
Sources (1)

TASK#STOMP steals documents and maintains redundant PowerShell C2

Severity
High
Status
Confirmed malware on an observed Windows endpoint; campaign scale unknown
Affected
Windows endpoints executing the recovered VBS/PowerShell chain
Malware
TASK#STOMP

Securonix analyzed one infected endpoint and decoded two Base64-encoded payload files. The chain creates four XML-defined scheduled tasks, places msdiag.vbs in the user’s Startup folder, backdates staged files, launches two hidden PowerShell modules and compiles small C# helpers at runtime. The decoded payloads scan fixed drives for business documents, monitor new and modified files, steal saved Wi-Fi passwords and clipboard data, capture screenshots and execute arbitrary PowerShell commands.

Both modules use corecloudfileshare[.]xyz and attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz with automatic failover and a static authentication token. Securonix does not attribute the activity to a known actor and does not claim a confirmed delivery vector. The observed IranTenders URL is therefore not treated here as a malicious domain.

Indicators (5)
  • corecloudfileshare[.]xyz
  • attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz
  • 5251098838fab2f3192307cac99ad2d3a71b55ba1f256412d43a9dfb3b93ac58 — VBS launcher
  • 103b4d4a666bc0a89c10c9df55f54f4be5fa111e8429c37ae14fa8f16cb50fe8 — sys_loader.ps1
  • 02ba7c982b68ec8f5a1cb47c6f3969f3f2f38ea9b4ebb8833d1b8b0ba2ab1407 — diag_pack.dat

Recommendations

  • Correlate wscript.exe creating several XML-defined scheduled tasks with hidden PowerShell execution from AppData and subsequent csc.exe/cvtres.exe activity.
  • Block the two confirmed C2 domains and search proxy/DNS telemetry retrospectively.
  • During containment, remove all scheduled tasks, the Startup copy and staged files together. Reboot and verify that msdiag.vbs, sys_loader.ps1 and win_conn.ps1 do not return.
Sources (1)

IOC summary

Type Indicator Context
Domain corecloudfileshare[.]xyz TASK#STOMP primary C2
Domain attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz TASK#STOMP backup C2
SHA256 5251098838fab2f3192307cac99ad2d3a71b55ba1f256412d43a9dfb3b93ac58 VBS launcher / msdiag.vbs
SHA256 103b4d4a666bc0a89c10c9df55f54f4be5fa111e8429c37ae14fa8f16cb50fe8 sys_loader.ps1
SHA256 02ba7c982b68ec8f5a1cb47c6f3969f3f2f38ea9b4ebb8833d1b8b0ba2ab1407 diag_pack.dat

Daily observations

  • All three retained events contain observed malicious activity, but only the Orkes item is a vulnerability with confirmed exploitation. Payload and TASK#STOMP are incident/campaign observations rather than vulnerability-exploitation claims.
  • Two events depend heavily on administrative control planes: Conductor workflow definitions and Active Directory Group Policy. Response must remove the malicious server-side configuration as well as endpoint artifacts.
  • TASK#STOMP’s initial-access path and campaign size remain unconfirmed; the report therefore uses its published infrastructure and behaviors for hunting without assigning an actor or victim sector.
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