Changes since yesterday
- NEW — Orkes Conductor:Fortinet telemetry confirms active exploitation of CVE-2026-58138. The pre-authentication workflow API flaw permits operating-system command execution on vulnerable Conductor servers.
- NEW — Payload:Kaspersky documented an incident at a Middle Eastern manufacturer where the attackers used a malicious Group Policy Object to lock administrators out and display ransom material after stealing data, without deploying a file encryptor.
- NEW — TASK#STOMP:Securonix decoded the final PowerShell payloads and confirmed automated business-document theft, continuous file monitoring, Wi-Fi password and clipboard collection, screenshots, and arbitrary remote commands through two C2 domains.
- ONGOING — Linux KEV:September 21 is CISA’s remediation date for CVE-2025-39682, CVE-2026-53266 and CVE-2025-39964, reported on September 19. No reviewed source identifies the actor or a shared exploit chain.
Priority actions
- Immediate:Upgrade exposed Orkes Conductor deployments to 3.30.2 or later. Until patched, remove external access to workflow API endpoints and review historical workflow submissions and child-process execution.
-
Immediate:Hunt Windows endpoints for TASK#STOMP’s
%LOCALAPPDATA%\WinDefendSvcstaging path, hidden PowerShell followed bycsc.exe, the two confirmed C2 domains, and repeated XML-defined scheduled-task creation fromwscript.exe. - Today:Review Group Policy creation and modification on Active Directory, especially policies that disable local administrator accounts, change desktop or lock-screen settings, or distribute ransom material. Protect GPO administration with separate privileged accounts and change auditing.
- Today:Complete remediation and pre-patch telemetry review for the three Linux kernel KEV entries whose CISA target date is September 21.
Priority threats
Orkes Conductor pre-authentication RCE is being exploited
- Severity
- Critical
- Status
- Confirmed active exploitation
- CVSS
- 9.8 (v3.1) / 9.3 (v4)
- CVE
- CVE-2026-58138
- Affected
- Orkes Conductor 3.21.21 before 3.30.2
CVE-2026-58138 allows an unauthenticated remote client to submit workflow definitions containing malicious JavaScript or Python expressions. Vulnerable GraalVM evaluators expose unrestricted host access, allowing those expressions to invoke operating-system commands with the Conductor process privileges.
Fortinet reported 1,290 blocked attempts in one 24-hour period ending September 9 and nearly 7,000 attempts from September 2 through 9. Independent honeypot telemetry cited in the same reporting observed exploitation attempts as early as July 24. Conductor 3.30.2 contains the fix.
Recommendations
- Upgrade to Conductor 3.30.2 or later and verify the running deployment, including containers and stale replicas.
- If patching is delayed, restrict workflow API endpoints to trusted networks and authenticated gateways.
- Review workflow definitions for unexpected INLINE, LAMBDA, DO_WHILE or SWITCH tasks containing JavaScript/Python expressions, and correlate them with unusual child processes or outbound connections from Conductor.
Payload uses Group Policy for encryptionless extortion
- Severity
- High
- Status
- Confirmed intrusion and extortion incident
- Affected
- Windows/Active Directory environments where attackers obtain privileges to modify Group Policy
Kaspersky’s Global Emergency Response Team described an incident at a manufacturing company in the Middle East in which the attackers stole corporate data and then used a malicious Group Policy Object named PAYLOAD for disruption. The policy disabled local administrator accounts and changed desktops and lock screens to ransom material. Kaspersky did not observe a conventional file-encryption payload in this incident.
The stolen data was later published on the dark web. The operational dependency is Active Directory control: once the attacker can modify Group Policy, endpoint malware scanning alone does not remove the policy that distributes the disruptive configuration.
Recommendations
- Audit privileged Group Policy changes and alert on policies that alter local administrator access, desktop/lock-screen configuration, startup scripts, scheduled tasks or security controls across many hosts.
- Restrict GPO modification to dedicated administrative identities and require strong authentication for those accounts.
- During response, remove or neutralize malicious policy at its source before restoring endpoint configuration; preserve domain-controller and Group Policy audit logs first.
TASK#STOMP steals documents and maintains redundant PowerShell C2
- Severity
- High
- Status
- Confirmed malware on an observed Windows endpoint; campaign scale unknown
- Affected
- Windows endpoints executing the recovered VBS/PowerShell chain
- Malware
- TASK#STOMP
Securonix analyzed one infected endpoint and decoded two Base64-encoded payload files. The chain creates four XML-defined scheduled tasks, places msdiag.vbs in the user’s Startup folder, backdates staged files, launches two hidden PowerShell modules and compiles small C# helpers at runtime. The decoded payloads scan fixed drives for business documents, monitor new and modified files, steal saved Wi-Fi passwords and clipboard data, capture screenshots and execute arbitrary PowerShell commands.
Both modules use corecloudfileshare[.]xyz and attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz with automatic failover and a static authentication token. Securonix does not attribute the activity to a known actor and does not claim a confirmed delivery vector. The observed IranTenders URL is therefore not treated here as a malicious domain.
Indicators (5)
corecloudfileshare[.]xyzattachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz5251098838fab2f3192307cac99ad2d3a71b55ba1f256412d43a9dfb3b93ac58— VBS launcher103b4d4a666bc0a89c10c9df55f54f4be5fa111e8429c37ae14fa8f16cb50fe8—sys_loader.ps102ba7c982b68ec8f5a1cb47c6f3969f3f2f38ea9b4ebb8833d1b8b0ba2ab1407—diag_pack.dat
Recommendations
- Correlate
wscript.execreating several XML-defined scheduled tasks with hidden PowerShell execution from AppData and subsequentcsc.exe/cvtres.exeactivity. - Block the two confirmed C2 domains and search proxy/DNS telemetry retrospectively.
- During containment, remove all scheduled tasks, the Startup copy and staged files together. Reboot and verify that
msdiag.vbs,sys_loader.ps1andwin_conn.ps1do not return.
IOC summary
| Type | Indicator | Context |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | corecloudfileshare[.]xyz |
TASK#STOMP primary C2 |
| Domain | attachmentsharingdrive[.]xyz |
TASK#STOMP backup C2 |
| SHA256 | 5251098838fab2f3192307cac99ad2d3a71b55ba1f256412d43a9dfb3b93ac58 |
VBS launcher / msdiag.vbs |
| SHA256 | 103b4d4a666bc0a89c10c9df55f54f4be5fa111e8429c37ae14fa8f16cb50fe8 |
sys_loader.ps1 |
| SHA256 | 02ba7c982b68ec8f5a1cb47c6f3969f3f2f38ea9b4ebb8833d1b8b0ba2ab1407 |
diag_pack.dat |
Daily observations
- All three retained events contain observed malicious activity, but only the Orkes item is a vulnerability with confirmed exploitation. Payload and TASK#STOMP are incident/campaign observations rather than vulnerability-exploitation claims.
- Two events depend heavily on administrative control planes: Conductor workflow definitions and Active Directory Group Policy. Response must remove the malicious server-side configuration as well as endpoint artifacts.
- TASK#STOMP’s initial-access path and campaign size remain unconfirmed; the report therefore uses its published infrastructure and behaviors for hunting without assigning an actor or victim sector.
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